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631 the resources of the primary economic area,
175 China did not again experience a protracted
433 period of disunity until the Taiping Rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century. Though free from the risks and losses of ocean transport and less vulnerable to pirate raids along the coast, the inland waterway was increasingly costly to operate and maintain. This fact and the military danger of over-reliance of the capital on the South for grain induced the Yüan, Ming, and Ch'ing dynasties to attempt development of the Hui River area near Peking by the construction of additional irrigation systems. The productive results of the projects never came up to expectations, however, because the climate and soil of the area were unfavorable.[15]

441 During the same period in Shansi,
175 individual initiative developed numerous similar
[312] hydraulic works in the province. Such private
[471] activity was uncommon in China and seems to
[565] have been an outgrowth of the relatively high
[438] degree of commercial development in Shansi.[16] The rise of a merchant class in the province began with the Shansi people's participation in trade with the Mongol nomads at state-regulated markets, established on the frontier

15. Ibid., p. 144.
16. Ibid., p. 144.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1f,
Sociological Background

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

565 The social structure in the North China Region closely resembles that of other regions of China. Because Peking in past centuries was the national capital of China (except for the period of 1927-49) and remains so today under the Communist regime, the social structure of North China is often taken to be more representative of the nation than are other regions which owing to their geographical locations and past histories have unique features of their own.

I. THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A. Social Classes

The people of traditional China often viewed society as being comprised of four occupational groups: the literati, the farmers, the artisans, and the merchants. Soldiers had no social status and were not members of any group. Although this classification indicates that all members of society recognized the prestige of the literati and the low status of the merchants it fails to account for two things: the wide diversity in wealth, standards of living, and cultural and recreational interests within each occupational group; and the free interchange of occupations among the top

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566 layers of the farming, merchant, and governing groups.[1]

In reality, social stratification in Chinese society was not entirely based on occupational lines. Rich merchants and wealthy landlords were often linked by marriage; retail merchants and middle peasants were socially compatible; the social distinction between a craftsman and a

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1. In some dynasties, sons of merchant families were not allowed to join the governing group. However with the help of economic resources, it was relatively easy for the third generation to come into the governing group. It was quite common for retired bureaucrats to engage in commerce. Toward the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912) there emerged in coastal provinces a group of gentry-merchants who might have the rank of expectant taotai and operated the official customs banks. Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West, A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923 Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1954, pp. 214-5.

[1] [Errata: pp. 110-119 omitted in pagination. This page follows p. 109 directly. -- Analyst]

555 simple peasant was even more difficult to draw; and bureaucrats were often wealthy landlords as well. Thus, if we employ the term social classes to mean the stratification of society on an economic basis, we will find that class lines cut across the traditionally accepted occupation-status classification.

556 However, members of all the occupational groups regarded the possession of land as the true indication of prestige and security. A landless peasant hoped to possess land, a peasant with some land hoped to acquire more, and the wealthiest landlord wished to do likewise. Artisans who had acquired savings would invest them in land. Merchants invariably put excess capital that might have been used for business expansion into land, although often they did not count on income from it as their principal means of support. Bureaucrats were even more preoccupied with owning land concomitant with their rise in officialdom. This is a common phenomenon in any society where other tangible assets for accumulation are lacking.

Although the possession of land was a criterion for determining prestige and to a large extent the sign of real power, prestige did not always result from wealth and the land-holdings of any one family seldom remained constant for more

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On the other hand, because of the existence of extended families and the clan structure, less fortunate members of these groups might be helped by relatives to gain a living or an education. A substantial amount of land was usually allotted to the communal family or clan for religious, educational, or charitable purposes by illustrious members of the family or clan. Nepotism was simply a projection of the family ideal of mutual help among the members. Clan nepotism often accounted for a man's rise on the social and economic ladder. This practice contributed to the upward movement of poorer segments of the population who otherwise might never have advanced socially and economically in a relatively short period of time.

The Scholar Ideal. Learing was much esteemed, especially when combined with wealth. The prestige of the wealthy was never complete until their wealth was adorned with culture. Indication of respect for learning was common in China, as typified by the saying: "Although your children may be of low intelligence, you as parents should make them study the Classics."[5]

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5. This stress on learning and cultivation of the Chinese was studied by Max Weber. In his Religion of China Weber goes so far as to conclude that this emphasis caused the lack of capital accumulation necessary for the development of modern capitalism in China. While this analysis may be over simple, it indicates how the traditional supremacy of officialdom over the merchant

555 The emphasis on learning was buttressed by the
565 imperial examination system, the means by
577 which official positions were obtained, which, in turn, during peace time was the quickest means to the acquisition of wealth and social prestige in China. The saying, "After I have studied I will take a government position," was indicative of the usual goal of education. Wealthy families as a matter of course and poorer families at great sacrifice educated one or more of their children in the Classics in order to obtain immediate prestige in the eyes of the community and with the hope of eventual success in the examinations, which might lead to an official position and enrichment of the family fortune. Thus, education contributed to the upward movement of the families be they of the landed, merchant, or bureaucrat groups. On the other hand, the allocation of family income to the support of one or more unproductive persons through years of study with no assurance of economic return often dissipated the fortune of the family and led to the loss of economic status. Moreover, the belief that those who used their brains were superior to those who used their brawn contributed to the scholars' contempt for manual skills

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groups may have impeded the rise of a system of negotiable property rights, protected by corporation law instead of official favoritism, and capable of supplying the investment capital needed for industrialization. Teng and Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 274-5.

555 and commercial activity. Therefore, if a schol-
565 ar did not pass the examination, or having passed
517 it, failed to obtain official appointment, and if the successive divisions of his family property reduced his own holdings to a small plot, he would find it difficult to improve his economic status. At the same time, his lack of economic means would deprive his children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the scholar ideal also contributed to the downward movement of families in the social hierarchy.

555 The scholars, therefore, are not to be regard-
565 ed as a separate class or a separate occupational
647 group, except as they relied for their livelihood
517 on the teaching profession or the use of their literary skills in a clerical capacity, but rather as "leisure" members of families of varying degrees of wealth of the bureaucratic, agricultural, artisan, or commercial groups. When recruited by the government to study at the imperial academies, scholars were protégés of the government and were regarded as potential bureaucrats even if they were engaged only in the compilation of historical documents of no current import. Certainly the majority of those who devoted their full time to study considered themselves potential bureaucrats. To those who did not cherish the dream of becoming bureaucrats and who had other economic means, education was only an additional sign of their prestige.

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555 565 517 701 The road to status and wealth through education and government service was often bypassed in time of chaos; military skills would enable individuals to obtain high positions in the bureaucracy. But military men seldom won social esteem until they had become cultivated, and such esteem generally accrued to their children, who were given the opportunity by reason of their parents' wealth to acquire learning under the tutelage of well-known scholars.

C. Social Organizations

575 579 Social organizations which had no basis in kinship were not recognized as approved parts of the social hierarchy or as approved means for gaining social prominence. However, they helped to supplement relationships otherwise neglected by the social order. Most of the traditional non-kin social organizations had an economic motivation. The success of such organizations, however, served as a disintegrating influence on the existing social system.

In rural areas organizations such as the Red Spear Society (Hung-ch'iang Hui) and the Mutual Protection Society (Lien-ya Hui) existed for the protection of its members against roving bandits. These voluntary associations arose in areas where the government failed to maintain order and peace, and their organization cut across class

the support of politicians, warlords as well as capitalists. Even the Kuomintang leaders had to come to terms with the society in their campaign against the warlords, and the Japanese occupation forces during 1937-1945 utilized Ch'ing-pang organizations to rout Communist underground agents.[8]

II. DISRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Just as the scholar ideal and the family ideal helped to preserve the stability of the total social order of China, the disintegration of the traditional family system and the abolition of the imperial examination system for recruiting the ruling elite became contributing factors to the dislocation of the traditional social structure.

There was no change in the social composition of the rural population in the past several decades. As of old, the village community consisted of farm laborers at the bottom and landlords at the top. Peasant landowners and tenants constituted the bulk of the village population; and village peddlers, merchants, and artisans were members of peasant families, most of which owned land; the village gentry, that is to say the local leaders were mostly retired officials or educated members of landlords' or rich peasants' families.[9]

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8. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

9. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, p. 68.

369 178 565 However, the growth of rural population, without a comparable increase in arable land, together with more opportunities for employment in the cities caused the migration of some peasants to the urban centers. The continued high premium placed on learning, practical or otherwise, induced the wealthier rural inhabitants to send their children to modern city schools which offered new opportunities. Thus, the cities became the centers from which the forces of change radiated into the surrounding countryside.

Some of the rural immigrants became permanent residents in the cities; others returned to their home villages. Among the permanent residents, some left their families in the country while others brought their immediate families (wives and children) to the cities. In either case, it meant the breakup of family and clan relations. Industrial work and other city employment changed the outlook of these rural people. New professions such as modern medicine, law, engineering, and banking attracted the attention of those who would otherwise have been occupied in the study of the Confucian Classics. This was especially true after Confucian training had been found "impractical" and not in keeping with the changing conditions. Education in the secondary schools and colleges, however inadequate and artificial it might seem, was

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designed for better citizenship.[10] Their curricula opened a new and different world, far more interesting and intelligible to the younger generation than the classics of old. If modern education had not always succeeded in giving new skills to the students, it at least had taught them not to be satisfied with their lot, but to look to the future rather than to the past for betterment. With the increase of schools, there emerged in the cities a considerable professional class and a large number of students cut off for years from their original environment. Students and intellectuals, seeking some common meeting ground, banded together, and with their newly-found organizations came a semblance of separate class consciousness. Although many students depended for their subsistence on their families they had nothing to do with the cultivation or management of land. Alienated from the land and anxious to find a new channel of social advancement, the intellectuals were confronted with the problems of social disorder. Furthermore, in contrast to the situation in Europe during a comparable cultural period, when the landed aristocracy contested with the merchants, industrialists, and bankers for positions

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10. Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance, the Haskell Lectures, University of Chicago, 1933, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934; Teng and Fairbank, op. cit.

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in the ruling elite, political power and economic power in modern China continued to be in the hands of a single group. When social mobility was made difficult by the lack of a clear and recognized channel for upward social movement, social roles were less clearly defined; the sons of high government officials became industrialists, bankers' sons became diplomats, and all owned land. Intermarriages between the new and the old upper-class elements were taken for granted. Modern intellectuals, mostly from middle-class families, were unable to obtain position and status in the new business or political hierarchy and yet were unwilling to return to their home villages. They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in school, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of the revolutionary Kuomintang and Communist leaders shows that the majority came from the middle-class, landowning, and merchant families, and attended modern schools.[11] The labor unions, the peasant associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectual began their new careers.

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11 Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-121.

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565 During this period of social and political
701 disorder, military men began to gain power,
517 obtaining offices by virtue of their military
198 success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampoa) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skill, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

565 The Chinese Communists interpret the exist-
668 ing social structure from a Marxist viewpoint, and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes.

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949) Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese

nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the people, and those who were to enjoy all the rights of the people. In the first group were included the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, "bureaucratic capitalists" such as H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The second group consisted of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the national bourgeois. Workers were considered the elite of the nation; the peasants were to be converted into rural workers through collectivization of agriculture or into urban workers through the development of industry; the petty bourgeois were needed during the New Democratic Stage and were to be "re-educated" in the process of reconstruction; and the national bourgeois, once "enslaved" by bureaucratic capitalism, were now "free" to contribute to the industrialization of China. Mao's classification of the Chinese population and his stipulation of the task of each class at the New Democratic Stage formed the conceptual basis from 1949 to 1954 for the Communist policy toward each of the classes.

The convocation of the National People's Congress in 1954 is considered by the Chinese Communists as the conclusion of the New Democratic Stage and the beginning of a transitional

stage which will lead China to socialism. Land reform is completed and the landlords as a class are eliminated, the wings of the bourgeois industrialists and merchants have been clipped by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the "ideology of the working class" has been established in all sectors of China.

B. The New Social Ladder

The Communists distinguish between persons "from the working class" and those "possessing the ideology of the working class." They acknowledge that not all Communists are from the working class but those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists say that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, viz., the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be from the working class, the army remains of the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most of the Chinese workers are fresh from the village where "feudalistic ideas" abound and therefore have not had time to acquire the ideology of the working class.

The classification of people according to the ideology they profess is one of the underlying principles governing the activities of the Com-

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565 668 munist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the labor unions, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology.

555 668 178 Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally through the promotion and supervision of the Federation of Democratic Women, encourages women to leave the confines of the family. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of high learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the individual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute for the traditional social structure. Since the individual relies on mass organizations for political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for the stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organizations, reward the achievement

668 183 in the country, where economic opportunities are increasingly restricted. He knows, after attending one Party meeting, that the peasantry is no longer the favored class in the Chinese economy.

668 566 The elite of the towns and cities are the functionaries of the government and Party. We know little of the pattern of their private lives. But, if the badge of the old Chinese bureaucratic elite was a leisurely and cultivated air, the badge of the new is a daily calendar of meetings, a full briefcase, and an air of purposeful, energetic activity. Their incomes permit their families a life somewhat easier than that granted the rest of the urban population, but they are constantly disciplined, watched by their colleagues, obliged to meet work quotas, and forced to submit to continuous indoctrination and re-indoctrination. Party and government workers are urged to use the New Year holiday to plan their work for the year to come.

The bulk of the old middle class may have survived, but its activities have been increasingly restricted by government controls and the growth of government producing and marketing facilities. They are a tough and tenacious group, but their old comfortable life is already threatened and, as a class, they are scheduled for extinction.[33]

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33. Rostow, op. cit., pp. 162-64.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1r,
Sociological Background

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

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184 The attitudes of an individual, although conditioned by the environment in which he lives and influenced by the persons with whom he comes in contact, are subject to changes that are wellnigh unpredictable; he may simultaneously adopt diametrically opposed attitudes without being aware of inconsistency. This fact, coupled with China's multitudinous regions and groups of people of varying characteristics, makes the task of gauging the attitudes of the Chinese people an exceedingly risky one at best. The Chinese, in general, are traditionally less outspoken than Americans. However, since attitudes manifest themselves in reactions and some of the reactions of the Chinese people are observable even in official Communist announcements, a few very general and broad conclusions may be drawn. In this discussion, attention is focused on the attitudes of the various groups of Chinese toward their country, the Communist government, and the ambitions and aspirations of the individual.

In sociological studies, occupational stratification is one recognized criterion for analyzing any society. In adopting this approach for our discussion, we do not propose to overlook the significance of grouping people according to other equally valid criteria, such as age, sex, and income. Older people, for example, are generally

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more conservative, less willing to adapt to change, and less likely to show enthusiasm for the Communist program. The rich, who have more to lose, are generally more dissatisfied with the Communist regime than their poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across the occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, occupational stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

I. FARMERS

The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with that of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with those of rich merchants, are all but non-existent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists chiefly of poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. However, since the Communists redesignated Peking as the capital and North China once again resumed its role as the most important region in China's cultural and political affairs, the farmers in this region are likely to be more aware of the existence of a community greater than their immediate environs. All the farmers in North China speak Northern Mandarin, which makes them feel quite at home in Peking. Thus they are more concerned with life in Peking than are those farmers in remote southwestern or south-

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184 eastern areas. In those villages in North China which were overrun by the Japanese during World War II, the growth of a spirit of nationalism is even more noticeable.

The Communist began to "educate and propagandize" the farmers in North China before those in the East China, Central-South, and Southwest region. There are probably more farmers in this region who have mastered a few political terms. Of course, this does not mean that the farmers have developed a strong national feeling. But, compared with other regions, North China has had a longer period of Communist rule, and the farmers in this region have been exposed to more opportunities of Communist indoctrination, a part of which is to foster a spirit of nationalism.

The idea that he is soon to be given land probably has generated apprehension even in the poorest peasant, who always believed he wanted to own land. To be sure, the gain through the process of land reform must have given the poor peasant some satisfaction, but subsequent grain taxes remain heavy and Communist efforts to collectivize the production and marketing of farm produce met resistance. Although there are fewer reports on the farmers' expression of dissatisfaction in North China, there is reason to believe that the poor farmer in this region is less happy than he was in the days immediately after

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184 the completion of Communist land reform, especially if he had experienced the "softer" kind of Communism in northern Hopei and Shansi provinces during the latter part of World War II. In this connection it is worth noting that land reform was somewhat modified in North China and was carried out with much less violence. The possibility still exists that changes in government policy may regain for the regime some of the farmer's enthusiasm.

There has been a great deal of publicity for the flood control projects on the Yung-ting River in Hopei Province. Farmers who have received benefits from the projects are undoubtedly impressed by the accomplishment of the new regime but subsequent floods may have brought a great amount of disillusionment to these farmers. Others who have never directly profited by the projects will have more reason to be skeptical. Available reports show that neither the government nor the farmers are satisfied with the amoun of relief and welfare work done thus far or with the manner in which this work is done. These reports were substantiated by the fact that the authorities in Tientsin have had to initiate a campaign to send many peasants back to their villages, indicating that life in rural communities in North China still does not offer enough incentive for the farmers to stay with their farming. As a result farmers continue to flood metropolitan centers in search of work and a better living.

The Chinese farmer's picture of a foreign culture was originally derived from contact with

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foreign missionaries. At one time foreign churches were established in all important cities and many larger villages in North China. Government efforts to foster xenophobia, supported by the effort of the ultranationalistic segment of the Chinese elite dated from the late nineteenth century. These efforts have been intensified by the Communists, who are trying to create a frightening image of "Western imperialism" in the eyes of the farmers. Many farmers in this region are likely to remember the stories about the Boxer Rebellion which ran rampant in Hopei and Shansi and victimized many foreigners. Memory of such anti-foreign uprisings may cause these farmers to fall easy prey to Communist anti-Western propaganda. A very small number of farmers who have been less influenced by anti-foreign propaganda and who have received benefits from foreign missionaries may be disturbed by the deliberate mistreatment of missionaries. Other farmers who regard the missionaries as an undesirable group may approve the "foreign devils' downfall." But the majority of farmers have had little or no contact with foreigners; they are not particularly concerned with the latter's fate in Communist China.

The Chinese farmer has always hoped to safeguard his family by acquiring land to provide a better education for his children and to maintain the respect of fellow villagers. Now that the farmer can no longer obtain as much land as he hopes, he seeks ways in which his children through education, can advance on the socio-economic ladder. The fact that many young

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people from peasant families have been absorbed in the government "cadre" system may induce the Chinese farmer to look more kindly upon the present regime. Of course, there are exceptions among the farming population. Farmers active in secret societies, which are traditionally resistant to government control, may have an altogether different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. Mass uprisings, in which secret societies played an important part, indicate that sometimes these groups have distinctly anti-foreign or anti-authoritarian characteristics. Members of some of these groups may uphold a standard of loyalty to the individual above traditional loyalty to the family or to the state; others may condone banditry and defy all forms of established social order. Due to closer surveillance by the Communists in North China secret societies are much less active in this region than in other regions.

II. URBAN WORKERS

In an industrial city like Tientsin in North China, the group feeling of organized workers was aroused as early as the 1920's when labor was involved in many political movements. Many industrial workers have long realized that they were "in the group" and somewhat later came to the conclusion that they had to work "for the group" in those movements launched against foreign influence and private capital. Having been involved in these movements, the worker undoubtedly formed a more definite idea of the

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nation and its symbols than that of the average farmer.

The Communists' avowed attempt to raise the status of the worker must have given the worker a feeling of importance as he learns of the Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He derives a measure of pride of achievement when a steel plant is erected or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the new China. Other promised benefits, including job security and welfare provisions also add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, despite the fact that most of these "benefits" still largely remain promises. Especially in North China where the workers were the first to see a "cultural center" and other recreational facilities dedicated to the Chinese working class, the morale among the workers is expected to be higher than that of the workers in other regions.

On the liability side of the Communist policy toward the worker are: the lack of substantial rise in the standard of living; a harsher working schedule and loss of leisure time; and illusory welfare program, which the Communists themselves admit cannot be realized until the worker has worked still harder to produce still more; and the disillusionment that the "proletariat" has not really become the master of the new China as the Communists had promised. Thus the worker's attitude toward the government and its policy must depend on how much he believes in a glorious "tomorrow" and how well

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he can put up with the physical hardships of "today." The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against driving the workers too hard appear to indicate that the laboring class is showing signs of possible exhaustion. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new managerial class fostered by the Communists, which, for whatever reasons, receives better treatment than do those who work on the production line.

Foreign advisors had been employed in many factories in pre-Communist days, and many workers may have become accustomed to accepting the general excellence of Western technology. However, any government effort to impose foreign leadership in technical fields may injure the pride of the worker and provoke his resentment. Certainly the demoralizing effect of the privileged treatment accorded Russian technicians in Chinese factories should not be discounted.

There is little evidence that the Chinese worker has abandoned his aspiration of personal advancement in the material sense. Although here again the promotion of the young and ambitious to serve in the huge government machine may satisfy some of the workers, the lack of a substantial betterment in their standard of living will lead many workers to feel that their aspirations cannot be fulfilled under the Com-

565 munist regime.

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III. STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS

517 Of all the groups of people in China, the
184 intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

Although the attitudes of Chinese intellectual differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some at least the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of dignity and power. After five years of Communist rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified and become a nation of

517 184 Many loyal Communist cadres are recruited from among the students who, so far, have not shown any lack of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. But while accepting Communism as their ideal, the students may not be able to suppress entirely a simultaneous impulse toward individualism. Furthermore, they may also find the reality of Communism or the individual's place in it less exciting and idealistic than promised by Communist preachments.

IV. BUSINESSMEN AND INDUSTRIALISTS

565 184 Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-business men and manufacturers, who have made up the larger part of China's urban population, continue to exist, although in substantially reduced numbers. Commerce has always occupied an inferior position in traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new and its position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had operated under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sounding phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of the state could evoke sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese

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market and caused dislocation in the Chinese economy.

Under the Peking regime, businessmen and industrialists as a group fare badly (possibly not much better than rich landowners), and the general mood in industrial and commercial circles is most probably unfavorable toward the government. The Communists have made it clear that small businessmen and manufacturers are only tolerated in the transitional stage of the "New Democracy", and that there will be no room for private enterprise in the socialist society which is the ultimate goal of the Communist regime. Meanwhile, these people have to carry a large share of the tax burden and face the stiff competition of and regulation by state enterprises. There is evidence that the businessmen and manufacturers accustomed as they are to government interference are finding the controls imposed by the Communist government increasingly strict, making it ever more difficult to manipulate or elude restrictive measures. This general mood of discontent is particularly observable among merchants and private industrialists in Tientsin which has been allocated large portions of government bonds, second only to Shanghai in East China.

If profit has been the most common motive among businessmen and manufacturers, under the present circumstances they have been forced to abandon or at least restrain their ambitions. Some of those who were allowed to do so have made a second choice -- that of changing their

565 184 careers. The more adaptable have escaped the purges by cooperating with the Communist regime. In this connection the Communists have appointed a number of erstwhile influential industrialists to serve in the government; it may be merely a conciliatory gesture of the Communists to win the support of small business, but it does provide this class of people with one temporary alternative to their lost hope.

An additional factor in provoking dissatisfaction among the merchants is the control on foreign trade. Merchants in north China seaports like Tangku and Chinwangtao, who had high hopes when the Nationalist blockade sealed off the rival port of Shanghai, are disillusioned because virtually all foreign trade is now handled by the government. Their role has been reduced to merely conducting limited export transactions supervised by the government, and there is no prospect that they may be allowed to import those Western manufactured goods which are highly profitable.

V. WOMEN

184 562 The customary position of women in China is subordinate to that of men. This tradition was so deep-rooted that it took superhuman courage for the first women to claim their "rights"; and the pain of "emancipation" continues under the Communists.

423 to work or were required to serve in forced labor camps. Others, classified as counter-revolutionaries within the meaning of the term as used in Decree on the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries by the Ministry of Public Security of the Government Administration Council in February 1951, were deprived of all political rights and placed under surveillance for a period of not less than three years.[6] These ex-landlords were placed in forced labor camps under the supervision of public security agencies and were subject to being sent to any area where a large labor force was required. There is no doubt that former landowners constituted the major portion of the forced labor battalions in Communist China.

•565 423 687 After land reform, many peasants and Party members had become members of the so-called "new rich," and as such were regarded by the Communists as "potential landlords." The growth of a new moneyed class was particularly serious in the North China Region. (See Party control in the rural areas in the chapter on Political Dynamics in this handbook.) The activities of these "potential landlords" were exhaustively reported. They were accused of contemplating or actually attempting hostile acts against the regime with the collaboration of former landlords; more particularly, they were accused of attempting to seize control of the rural government and of attempting to destroy

6. Test of the regulation in ibid, Feb. 22, 1951, p. 1.

565 the system of agricultural producers' co-operatives. In December 1954, renewed warnings
423 against them were voiced by the Communists.
687 The case of Ch'ang-li hsien was cited. According to the report, former landlords, aided by the "new rich," had succeeded in infiltrating a producers' co-operative in order to destroy it. Having become members of the co-operative, the "counterrevolutionaries" bribed Party cadres and employed collaborators to capture key positions in the organization. They spread rumors and created dissension in an effort to disorganize the co-operative. The Communists accused members of the co-operative of showing contempt for the poor peasants by inviting "rich peasants" to join. (Regulations forbid the acceptance of landlords and "rich peasants" as members of the co-operatives.) Landlords were charged with creating unrest in the rural areas, burning granaries, killing cattle, murdering Communist members, and destroying dams and agricultural implements owned by the co-operatives.

C. Suppression of Nationalist Elements and Espionage Activities

668 The suppression of counterrevolutionaries in North China at first was carried out under joint direction of the Government Administration Council and the People's Supreme Court.[8]

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7. Ibid., Dec. 15, 1954, p. 1.

8. Report on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in Hopei Province, Ho-pei Jih-pao [Hopei Daily], Oct. 30, 1950, p. 1.

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF12 North China AF12

Size of Family

The 400 families included a total of 2,536 persons, an average of 6.3 persons per family. The total, however, included 64 year-round workers who lived with the families. If they are omitted, the size of the average family was 6.2. How the average size of the family increased as the size of the farm increased, from 3.8 persons for the families with 10 mu or less to 6.7 persons for those in the 31–40 mu group and 13.5 persons for those with over 100 mu, is shown in Table 17. If the 64 full-time workers are omitted, the average family was 8.2 for the 41–50 mu group, 8.8 for the 51–100 mu group, and 11.8 for the over 100 mu group. These were the only groups with enough full-time workers to affect the size of the average family. Ordinarily, we have not omitted the full-time workers as they were given their board by their employers and so were part of the family "mouths".

In other studies of Chinese families, we have regularly found that as the amount of the family income increased the average size of the family increased. In this study increased size of farm holding usually indicates increased family income. From the figures, it appears that there was a tendency for the average size of the family to increase some 35 per cent with a 100 per cent increase in the size of the farm.

The amount of land farmed by the family also appears to have a definite influence on both the number and the proportion of children in the family. The average number of children from one to 10 years of age, Chinese count, increased from 0.6 per family for the 1–10 mu group to 3.2 for the over 100 mu group. The proportion of children was 15 per cent in the families with 30 mu or less, but it was 24 per cent for the families with more than 100 mu.

The population density was 785 persons per square mile of crop area. It was about 650 per square mile if an average area for the home sites in the villages is added to the cultivated area and an allowance made for graves, roads, and wasteland.

For the 400 families the average amount of land per person was 4.8 mu, 0.8 of an acre. For the 1–10 mu group, the average was less than one-third of an acre per person. Table 17 shows how the amount increased as the size of the farm increased until the average for the over 100 mu group was five times the average for the 1–10 mu group.

The 2,536 members listed by the 400 families were divided 1,348

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 . AF12 North China AF12

family increased as the size of land holdings and the size of the family increased. It was 1.2 for the landless group but three times that for the 75–99 mu group.

The proportion engaged in home industry decreased for both the males and the females as the land holdings increased. The highest top figures were 45.0 per cent for the males and 69.2 per cent for the females. Both were in the under 25 mu group. If we assume that from 25 to 30 per cent of the females were girls too young to work (in our 5,255 families 25.3 per cent of the females were under 12 and 29.2 per cent were under 14 years of age), it seems evident that almost all of the older females in the families with less than 25 mu were doing some home industry. Even in the families with 100 or more mu of land 45.3 per cent of all the females were reported as working in home industry. Spinning is easy to do and the extra personal income undoubtedly appealed.

Detailed figures for three villages showed that from 40 to 57 per cent of the home industry workers began working before they were 15 years of age and that from 92 to 96 per cent began before they were 20 years of age. In one village there were two men who said they began working before they were 10 years old. There were two men and three women who began after they were 50 while one man and one woman said they started after they were 60 years old. Eleven persons said they had worked 65 or more years. Two women claimed to have worked 70 years.

The value of the annual industrial output was estimated to be $279,715, an average of $230 per family and $85 per worker. The average profit was estimated to be 16.4 per cent, $37.60 per family and $13.95 per worker per year. For the entire hsien the average income from home industry was estimated as $12.50 per family.[2]

The profit figures for the males and females show a wide range in the different villages. For the males the amount varied from $10.50 to $34.45. For the females the lowest amount was an average of $3.65 per year, one cent a day. In four villages the amount was less than $8.20 per year. The highest amount was $24.05 but that was in the mat weaving village, where it was impossible to separate the work of the men and the women and both had to be given the same average. If the division could be made, the average for the females would undoubtedly be considerably lower and that for the males correspondingly higher.

While we found it difficult to get an accurate estimate of the amount

2. See Chapter XV.

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF12 North China AF12

511 mortgage and five rented part of the land they farmed. Land held under mortgage was practically owned by the mortgagee. Instead of paying interest on the mortgage, the owner turned the land over to the mortgagee subject, of course, to the right of redemption. The area farmed by the individual families varied from eight to 60 mu. The total was 1,061.6 mu. Of this, 976.8 mu were owned, 53 mu were held under mortgage, and 31.8 mu were rented. The 3 per cent of rented land was low when compared with the 6.9 per cent average for the 3rd District and the 12.2 per cent average for the hsien. None of the 34 farms was large enough to warrant employing a full-time worker.

511 565 The average farm area per family was 31.2 mu, 5.2 acres. This was some 36 per cent more than the average for the Experimental District and 47 per cent more than the hsien average of 21.2 mu per farm operating family.[3] Our average family very evidently belonged to a higher income group than the average Ting Hsien family. This difficulty is overcome, to some extent, by dividing our budget families into four income groups beginning with $100 per year and with an income range of $100 per year per group. The number of families in these income groups is smaller than we would like, but, even so, their figures seem to give a reasonable picture of the distribution of family expenditure at different income levels.

How the families were divided among the different income groups and how the average number of mu per family varied with the amount of the family income from 14.8 mu for the $100–$200 group to 41.8 mu for the $400–$500 group is shown in Table 36.

The 34 families ranged in size from two to 12 persons. The total number of persons was 205, an average of 6.0 persons per family. This was only slightly higher than the average of 5.8 persons in the 5,255 families living in the 1st District.[4] As the farm of our average family contained six mu, 24 per cent, more land than the average farm in the 1st District, we should be inclined to expect more of a difference in the size of the average families. Since the families in the $200–$300 income group averaged 5.9 persons and their farms 27.7 mu, or very nearly the average figures for the families in the 1st District, it seems possible to infer that the average incomes of the two groups were fairly comparable. For our $200–$300 group, the average annual income was $262.65 per family, $44.50 per person.

3. See Chapter X.

4. See Chapter IV.

S. Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF12 North China AF12

That the number in the family was very definitely related to the size of the family income is shown by the increase in the average persons per family from 5.8 in the $100–$200 group to 9.3 in the $400–$500 group.

Figure 15 shows how closely the size of the family was related to the size of the farm. The number of mu per person, in the highest income group, was only 15 per cent more than in the lowest income group. The 400 farm families[5] showed a tendency for the size of the family to increase some 35 per cent with an increase of 100 per cent in the size of the farm.

As the number of mu per person was less in the $400–$500 income group than in the $300–$400 group, we wonder whether the higher income families might not have had a fairly recent influx of relatives that had increased the size of the average family and reduced the number of mu per person. It may be, however, that, since these larger families had sources of income other than farming, they had not increased their land holdings. The families in this income group received 31.4 per cent of their income from non-farm sources. With an average surplus of some $116, they had sufficient means to purchase additional land, if desired.

The 205 family members were divided 106 male and 99 female, or 51.7 per cent male. The masculinity rate of 107 was only slightly higher than the rate for the 515 and the 5,255 families included in our population study in Chapter II.

The age distribution of the family members showed a much larger proportion in the 16–30 age group than was true in the two other and larger groups of Ting Hsien families, 35.7 per cent, as compared with 24.9 and 24.3 per cent. This was offset by smaller proportions in the 1–15 and 31–45 year groups.

The relationship distribution was practically the same as that found in the two larger groups of families. Eighty-three percent were members of the immediate family of the head of the household, or his direct descendants; 7 per cent belonged to an older generation and 10 per cent were brothers, their families, and sisters. The details of the distribution are shown in Table 4.

Only 22 per cent of the family members who were 15 years of age or older were single, 22 males and 11 females. All of the women over 24 years of age had married. Three men over 24 were still single. There

5. See Chapter III.

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 . AF12 North China AF12

per cent as the family income increased. The proportions spent for rent and clothing stayed about the same, averaging 5.1 and 6.4 per cent. That used for fuel, however, instead of remaining about the same, decreased from 8.3 to 5.3 per cent, a more rapid rate of decrease than that for food. This probably was the result of the small amount of fuel used for heating by Chinese families. Expenditure for fuel for cooking and lighting would probably not increase proportionately with the family income. We found the same decrease in the per cent used for fuel by families living in Peking.[7]

The proportion of the family budget used for food by the Ting Hsien families was higher than that used by Peking families with similar incomes. The larger size of the rural families in all except the $100–$200 group would readily account for this difference. The rural families in the $400–$500 group averaged 9.3 persons, but the city families with incomes between $420 and $480 a year averaged only 5.1 persons. In the next higher city group, the average was only 3.9 persons.[8]

The proportion used for clothes was very similar in the rural and city groups, as was that used for miscellaneous and surplus together. The percentages for rent and fuel were distinctly less for the rural families.

Because of the importance of the expenditure for food, we have made a detailed study of the amounts spent for eight different groups. Millet, which is the principal grain in the Ting Hsien area, was segregated from the other grains and flours. Sweet potatoes, another large item in the family diet, were also given a separate classification. Vegetables, condiments, meat, fruit, and miscellaneous were the other groupings.

The average expenditure of the different income groups for each of the eight food groups is shown in Table 40. It will be noted that in all the income groups by far the largest amount was spent for millet; the amounts for other grains and for sweet potatoes were similar though the grain amounts were regularly larger. The amount for vegetables was about 60 per cent of that for sweet potatoes. The amounts for condiments and meat were much smaller, generally under 50 cents a month. Fruit was a very minor item with an average of some 10 cents per month.

While the amounts per family changed as the family increased, the proportionate distribution of the food expenditure remained practically the same for all the income groups. The approximate division for

7. Gamble, *op. cit.*

8. Gamble, *op. cit.*

2: Gamble S-5 (1928-1953) 1954 : AF12 North China AF12

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the four income groups was 36 per cent for millet and 25 per cent for the other grains, a total of 61 per cent for grain and flour; sweet potatoes were about 21 per cent and vegetables 12.5 per cent. Condiments, meat, fruit, and miscellaneous together took only 5.6 per cent of the average family food budget.

This similarity of distribution was not found in the budgets of Peking families. There the grains and flours decreased and meat increased as the family income increased. City families with incomes from $20 to $25 per month spent some 62 per cent of their food budget for grain and flour. Condiments were 13 per cent, over four times the country figure. Fruit and miscellaneous together were 6.8 per cent, over 13 times the corresponding rural figures. Vegetables were 50 per cent larger in the farm budget. Sweet potatoes, for which the rural families used some 21 per cent of their food expenditure, were not separately listed in the city diet. Generally, the city families considered sweet potatoes distinctly a country food.[9]

The difference in the size of the families in the different income groups makes it difficult to compare their food expenditure directly, but when the amounts are expressed in terms of amounts per person or per adult male equivalent there is a great similarity between the total food figures for the different income groups and in the figures for all of the eight different food divisions. Table 39 shows how close the agreement is. Interestingly enough the amount per adult male equivalent is largest in the lowest income group, and there is a slight but regular decrease in each group as the family income increases.

The small differences in the distribution of the food expenditure and the small differences in the total expenditure per adult male equivalent in the different income groups make it seem evident that there was almost a standard diet for these Ting Hsien families and that once this was attained there was little change even with considerable change in the family income. The amounts per family changed, but generally only in response to a change in the size of the family. The standard diet evidently was available even to the families in our lowest income group. It probably would be available to other small low income farm families in Ting Hsien. The diet was amost entirely dependent on local production. The expenditure per person was so small that it would be difficult to include any considerable amount of imported food.

9. Gamble, *op. cit.*

2:Gamble S-5(1926-1933)1954 AF12 North China AF12

The average food expenditure of $2.40 per month per person, $3.00 per month per adult male equivalent, and $3.30 per month per cost consumption unit gives a very definite picture of the food expenditure of these families. Buck's figure for the food expenditure of families in Hopei province was $22.94 per adult male equivalent per year.[10] This was 35 per cent below our figure but was based on figures secured some six years earlier.

In Peking the food expenditure of the families with incomes of from $15 to $25 a month was $2.55 per capita and $3.60 per cost consumption unit per month.[11]

The amounts of food per adult male equivalent used by the average family in the different income groups naturally show the same similarity as the expenditure figures. The small amounts of condiments, meat, and fruit are especially noticeable. Five pounds of meat and three and a half pounds of fruit per person per year means that those were very minor items in the general diet. (See Figure 17 and Table 40.)

The average amount of food per person per year was 1,030 catties. Per day this was 2.8 catties, or 3.8 pounds. For the average adult male equivalent the amount was 3.75 catties, 5.0 pounds per day. For the individual families the amount per person per year ranged from 780 to 1,485 catties or from 2.9 to 5.4 pounds per day.

The average daily diet of a member of these families was 17 pound ounces of grain and flour, 25 ounces of sweet potatoes, 19 ounces of vegetables, and 0.8 of an ounce of other foods. By weight the diet was 40 per cent sweet potatoes, 31 per cent vegetables, 28 per cent grains, one per cent condiments, meat, fruit, and miscellaneous.

The large amounts of millet and sweet potatoes are the outstanding items in the food list. Other areas report using sweet potatoes, but not in anywhere near the same amount. Other areas also report using more kaoliang or wheat than millet.

The 34 families reported an average sweet potato consumption of 430 catties per person per year. We have been interested to note that the farm production estimates for the hsien gave a total for sweet potatoes that was equivalent to 465 catties per person if the hsien population is taken as 408,000 persons. The 400 families estimated that all but 2 per cent of the sweet potato crop was consumed on the farm. This

10. J. Lossing Buck, *Chinese Farm Economy* (University of Chicago Press, 1930).
11. Gamble, *op. cit.*

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF12 North China AF12

families lived might account for some, but hardly for all, of the differences.

Miscellaneous included two payments on debts and the expenditure for the one funeral reported. The debt payments were $31.00 and $15.50. The funeral cost $13.49.

TABLE 36. AVERAGE SIZE OF FAMILY, FARM, HOUSE, INCOME

Income Group	No. of Families	Average No. of Persons	Average A.M.E.[1]	Average C.C.U.[2]	Mu per Family	Mu per Person
$100–200	8	3.8	2.8	2.8	14.8	3.9
200–300	9	5.9	4.5	4.1	27.7	4.7
300–400	14	6.7	5.3	4.9	40.6	6.1
400–500	3	9.3	7.4	6.8	41.8	4.5
Average		6.0	4.7	4.4	31.2	5.2

Income Group	Rooms per Family	Persons per Room	Income per Family	Income per Person	Income per A.M.E.[1]
$100–200	4.6	0.8	$166.75	$35.80	$58.50
200–300	6.6	0.9	262.65	40.70	59.40
300–400	8.2	0.8	345.00	46.70	64.90
400–500	6.6	1.5	454.65	46.20	61.45
Average	6.7	0.9	290.95	43.70	61.35

[1] Adult Male Equivalent. [2] Cost Consumption Unit.

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 : AF 12 North China AF12

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TABLE 40. AVERAGE AMOUNT OF FOOD USED PER YEAR[1]

Income Group	Millet	Other Grain	Sweet Potatoes	Vegetables	Condiments	Meat	Fruit	Misc.	Total
				Catties per Family					
$100–200	665	465	1,685	1,250	34	13	19	3	4,134
200–300	1,030	705	2,380	2,090	52	23	8	6	6,292
300–400	1,165	765	2,880	2,130	54	27	20	3	7,044
400–500	1,525	980	4,090	2,900	72	25	12	2	9,606
Average	1,050	700	2,580	1,970	50	22	15	4	6,391
				Catties per Adult Male Equivalent					
$100–200	238	166	600	446	12.1	4.6	6.8	1.1	1,474.6
200–300	230	158	530	465	10.5	5.1	1.8	1.3	1,401.7
300–400	220	144	543	400	10.2	5.1	3.8	0.6	1,328.7
400–500	206	132	555	390	9.7	3.4	1.6	0.3	1,298.0
Average	224	149	550	420	10.6	4.7	3.2	0.9	1,362.4

[1] Adjusted for difference between lunar and solar years.

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF 12 North China AF 12

11–24 year group: males 65 per cent, females 36 per cent, total 53 per cent. The Tung T'ing figures were only slightly smaller: males 60 per cent, females 37 per cent, total 49 per cent. The highest figures for any one age group were in the 10–14 year group in the city. For that group the literacy figures were males 81.8 per cent, females 19.0 per cent, total 54.5 per cent, but it will be noted that the figure for the females was only about half those for Chai Ch'eng and Tung T'ing.

Literacy and family income were closely related. The effect of the amount of the family income, measured by the size of the family farm, on the educational opportunities of the family is shown very strikingly in the 515 families. Only 56.6 per cent of the families with less than 50 mu of farm land had any literate members. In the 50–99 mu group the figure was 98.8 per cent. All the families in the 100 mu and over group had at least one literate member. The effect of the size of the family farm on the proportion of the family members who were literate is shown by the following figures for the 11–50 year age group in the 500 families in the Experimental District. The figures also show how the increase, through the years, in the number of village schools and greater interest in education had increased the literacy of the younger people.

Land	*Per Cent Literate*	*Age*	*Per Cent Literate*
Under 25 mu	16.9	11–14	57.3
25–49	31.7	15–19	51.2
50–74	45.6	20–24	39.1
75–99	51.0	25–29	28.8
100 mu and over	58.1	30–34	22.1
Average	27.7	35–39	18.2
		40–44	22.2
		45–49	20.3

The same effect of age is shown by the literacy figures for the males and females in the 400 farm families.

	Per Cent Literate			*Per Cent Literate*	
Age	*Males*	*Females*	*Age*	*Males*	*Females*
5–10	21	6.5	51–60	35	–
11–20	55	11.5	61–70	34	–
21–30	43	3.1	71–80	18	–
31–40	30	1.3	Over 80	–	–
41–50	25	0.6	Total	37	4.0

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF 12 North China AF 12

871 212 565 The following figures show how, for the 515 families, the average number of students per family and the years in school increased and the average age at which the students entered school decreased as the size of the family farm increased.

Mu	*Aver. with Ed.*	*Per Cent of Family*	*Aver. Years in School*	*Aver. Age Entered School*
Under 50	1.1	18	3.9	8.8
50–99	3.5	33	6.1	7.8
100 and over	4.5	35	7.3	7.2

Where the head of the family could read the literacy figure was 49 per cent. Where he could not read it was only 25.6 per cent.

The very definite effect of the father's occupation on literacy is shown by the following figures.

Occupation	*Per Cent Literacy*
Education, government, military	71
Merchant	48
Farmer	33
Manual laborer	18

871 China's old educational system was based on the Chinese classics and aimed to prepare the students for the government examinations. The local district examinations were held in Ting Hsien in the examination halls that, during the latter part of our study, were the headquarters of the Mass Education Movement. The old style education was given privately, by a tutor in a wealthy family, by a scholar who earned his living teaching a group of pupils who came to his home, or in schools maintained by some villages.

The first modern school of which we found a record was a private school opened in 1894. Villages began to establish schools about 1902 but it was not until after the Republic was established in 1912 that rapid progress was made. The influence of the magistrate Sun Fa-hsü, appointed in 1914, was especially strong in the establishment of schools. Many temples were given up at that time and their buildings were taken over for the new schools.

China's general educational system was a six-six-four division, elementary school six years, middle school six years, college four years. The elementary school period was divided at first, lower primary three years,

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF 12 North China AF 12

875 Hsien the teacher was changed 11 times in 22 years.[3] Low salaries were undoubtedly responsible for much of the changing, especially during the time when salaries were still paid in rapidly depreciating copper coins. The shift from copper to silver was made about 1924.

The average annual salary of the lower primary teachers was $90 per year. It was $150 for the higher primary teachers. For the lower primary schools the minimum salaries were between $50 and $59 dollars. The maximum were in the $120–$139 group. For the higher primary teachers the lowest was in the $100–$119 group; the highest in the $160–$179 group. Almost half were in the highest group.

The number of women teachers, 10, was so small that it is difficult to draw any definite conclusions about their salaries, but the distribution figures seem to show that the salaries of the women teachers tended to be lower than those of the men.

Sixty-one per cent of the teachers had had normal school training; another 30 per cent were middle school graduates. Two had not gone beyond higher primary school. Two of the older men had won the hsiu t'sai degree, the first of the classical examination system. It would be difficult to judge the educational experience of students of a school for prison attendants, the society for the study of self-government, or a medical training school. They were each represented by one teacher in the 62 villages.

876 The usual teaching schedule called for the teacher to give from 8 to 10 different courses and to teach from 30 to 34 hours per week. Forty-seven per cent reported that number of courses while 52.6 per cent reported that many hours. Nine teachers said they taught less than five courses; another nine reported that they were giving from 11 to 13 courses. Nine were teaching less than 20 hours per week. Only one reported more than 34 hours per week.

871 Twelve of the 63 schools reported that they employed servants. Three-quarters of the 12 had only one servant but one school had five. Eight of the 19 servants were part-time workers. Wages ranged from $4.00 to $10.00 per year for the part-time workers and from $24 to $70 a year for those on full time.

875 A study of the families of the teachers, the amount of land the families owned, and the value of the family property showed that, as might be

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3. Sidney D. Gamble, "Hsin Chuang", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1944).

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF 12 North China AF 12

expected, the teachers, in general, came from the larger and wealthier families. The median family had 10 members and some 50 mu of land worth about $5,000. Only one family had no land, while 82 per cent of the families had at least 20 mu. Fourteen per cent had 100 mu or more. For 18 per cent of the families the value of the family land was less than $2,000. For 10 per cent it was $10,000 or more.

Fifty-nine of the 71 married teachers reported that they had a total of 61 boys and 51 girls. Seven reported no children. Seventy-six per cent of those reporting had not more than two children. However, as 74 per cent of the teachers were under 30 years of age and 85 per cent under 40 years of age, their families probably were still incomplete.

All but two of the 63 village schools were housed in buildings owned by the village. In four villages the school buildings were also used for the office for village affairs.

The school buildings had an average of some seven chien for class rooms, offices, storage; 11 had less than five chien. Only five schools had more than 15 chien. They undoubtedly were the four schools with higher primary departments and probably one of the two schools for both boys and girls. Fifty-four per cent of the school buildings had from five to nine chien. This probably was adequate space as 52 of the schools had only one teacher.

The schools generally operated on a six day week. All of the schools closed for the New Year holidays, most of them for a full month. Some had even more than a month so that the pupils would be free to help with the preparation for the New Year and also have the full first month. Some had only about three weeks and began soon after the Feast of Lanterns on the 15th of the First Month.

All but one of the schools had vacation at the time of the spring wheat harvest. The date depended upon the season. For most of the schools that vacation period was about half a month. A few had as much as a month while a few others had less than ten days.

The schools that had a spring vacation also had vacation at the time of the fall harvest. Its dates also depended upon the season. Most of the schools were closed for a month or a month and a half. One school, however, reported its vacation as less than 20 days. Another had two months.

One village, Chai Ch'eng, closed its schools for a summer vacation. It probably was the one school that did not have the harvest time vaca-

3:Chao E-5 (1939-1941)1948 AF12 North China AF12

618 578 are the leading figures of the H-clan. Their relations can be characterized as harmonious, but in public appearance as well as in family relations, the school principal is subordinate to his distant uncle, the head of the *pao*. As to the other members of the clan, publicly, they act toward one another as clansmen, but inside their own houses they talk differently. Some of them even make accusations against their clansmen who belong to different families, in front of non-clan villagers and some of our investigators whom they take in as their friends.

608 The system of co-relations so popular throughout China is also found in P'ing-chiao-tsun. We have often heard the villagers say that so-and-so was so-and-so's *kan*-father or *kan*-son. All the kinship terms are employed except that a prefix "kan" 乾 is added to each term. There are rights and obligations among co-relatives.[26] Co-relatives are neither related by blood nor by marriage. Through a certain proper ritual, two persons or two families can be made into co-relatives. The degree of intimacy between co-relatives, however, depends upon factors other than the ritual itself.

609 571 Kinship terms such as "uncle" and "aunt" are extended to non-clan villagers. Nevertheless, this extension is only a matter of courtesy or an expression of very close neighborliness and friendship. No segregation between clansmen and non-clan villagers can be observed. Indeed, non-clan individuals may be taken into the inner circle of social communication while a clansman may be excluded from it. Kinship tie is not very strong in P'ing-chiao-tsun.

571 From one of our investigations, territorial propinquity is an important factor in the matter of non-paid borrowings, e.g., the temporary inter-family borrowings of agricultural implements and household utensils. In many cases, a house-wife borrows fire from her neighbor's stove to cook her family meal.

565 824 556 The economic status in terms of the level of living of a family is a very important factor in social intercourse in P'ing-chiao-tsun. The villagers classify their households into three standings: upper, middle and low. There is only one family in the upper class. About one-third of the families belong to the low class. As already indicated previously, the upper family is isolated in the village, and their

26 The system of co-relations in China is in many respects quite comparable with the Pascuan system of ceremonial sponsorship as mentioned in E. H. Spicer, Pascua, A Yaqui Village in Arizona, Chicago, 1940.

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isolation is quite voluntary. The separation between the low and the rest is, however, largely involuntary. The isolation in this case is not quite as complete as that of the rich family.

Social communication is a very subtle factor in human cooperation. As there are so many factors conditioning and, in a way, hindering the process of free communication, P'ing-chiao-tsun is not a very integrated whole. Collective action,[27] if it exists at all, is in need of a sound basis. Thus the principle of political inaction has its root in social communication.

Urbanization

In many respects, the village folks may have their characteristic ways of life; P'ing-chiao-tsun, nevertheless, is a part of the larger community of Peiping, economically, politically and socially.

P'ing-chiao-tsun is at present connected with the city of Peiping by two highways and one railway line.[28] Bus services are available at a distance of four miles and the railway station is about one mile away. No rickshaws are available in the village, but their supply is plentiful in the nearest town about a mile away. Only one bicycle is found and it is the property of the school principal. On business trips, the villagers may use their own carts, hire a rickshaw, or use the railway. On pleasure trips, they prefer to economize their financial resources at the expense of their own organic energy. The time-distance on foot is about two hours to the nearest city-gate. Unless on very special occasions, females have very little chance to see the city. The school principal is the most frequent visitor to the city.

Agricultural products are sold if at all to the agents in the nearest market-town, and very seldom directly to merchants in the city. There are, however, two families in the village which have duck-raising as their occupation. On the days of temple-fairs in the city, the heads of the families with their assistants drive their stock to their customary market-places. These two families have their interests more in the city than in the village. Mr. W-, the head of

27 On general sociological principles of social interaction and collective action, see R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, **Introduction to the Science of Sociology**, Chicago, 1924; also Richard T. LaPiere, **Collective Behavior**, New York, 1938.

28 On the influences of communication agencies upon social life, see M. M. Willey and S. A. Rice **Communication Agencies and Social Life**, New York, 1933.

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735 their former condition. The monetary inflation was accelerated in
556 the last years of the war. Those who had little reserve were very
558 hard hit. Some of the clever rich had profited. The short period of price-falling, immediately after the war, had a bad effect on those who had full confidence in the government, when the inflation came back again even at a more rapid rate of acceleration.

● 565 Members of the richest family were not in the village. They
556 looked for and lived in cities, as places of security and merriment.
427 Their house and farm were in the hands of two old laborers. These
463 two old laborers of the house became managers of the farm and hired other laborers for the work. The relation of the two laborers to members of the house was one not merely economic in nature, but something personal. The rent of the land was not fixed but varied from year to year at the good will of the managing-laborers. The house was very much dilapidated which was a sign of negligence on the fact of the managing-laborers, and the scant attention paid by the proprietors to their property. The relation of the two groups of laborers was interesting. The manager-laborers had not sufficient time to assume the attitude of a managing-farmer. They commanded the respect of the hired laborers, not so much by their authority, but rather because of their skill in farming.

621 The major effect of the end of the war was the change in the
662 formal political machinery, and the consequential shift in its person-
622 nel. The *pao-chia* system was there when we first revisited the village, but the *fang-li* system and the *Hsin Min Hui* were no longer in existence. The school principal became the deputy head of the *lien-pao* together with new heads of the six old *chia*. Beneath this superficial structure was the struggle for power between two groups. An ambitious duet of father and son wanted to control the *lien-pao*. They organized a group of self-protection militia with the explicit purpose of strengthening the protection of life and property in the local district. They utilized external influence to oust the head, and the deputy head, of the *lien-pao* by accusing them as collaborators of the enemy.

Amidst this struggle for power came a mishap to the deputy head, and his removal from the position of school principal. Whether his removal had anything to do with the poljtical struggle was not known, but following this removal he resigned his office of deputy head. The whole episode was certainly a blow to Mr. H. As we may recall, Mr. H. had the ambition to restore the status

4: Burgess E-4,5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12

tion of woman labor in the factory (formerly they manufactured only in the homes), night work for women and children,[1] the concentration of large numbers of workers in the large cities, with the attendant overcrowding and general bad housing conditions.[2] Labor has been recruited in many cases by labor contractors who have profited by the low wages.[3] The large number of workers in the factory unit, added to the contract system, has destroyed the former close personal relation between master and men. These and many other changes in the life of the laborers, unmitigated by enforceable labor legislation,[4] have brought discontent and class hatred, with strikes that frequently result in bloodshed.[5] The passivity of the workers is disappearing and a class-conscious labor movement is developing. In the tending of the machine the sense of creative accomplishment has gone.

44 per cent); two-thirds of these children were victims of machinery accidents, the majority having received head or hand injuries. It was the night shifts which suffered most, as indeed happens wherever work is carried on continuously."—Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[4] Adelaide M. Anderson, *Humanity and Labour in China* (London, 1926), chap. vii, "Things Industrial Seen in China," pp. 163-202.

[1] Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[3] *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

[5] Ta Chen, *Analysis of Strikes in China from 1918 to 1926* (Shanghai, 1926) and *The Labor Movement in China*, pp. 19-20. Henry, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21: "It is accordingly in modern factories, in spite of the immense superiority of their workshops as regards equipment, that the elements of revolt among the workers are fomented. Strikes and mutinies, the latter going so far as the assassination of foremen, increase year by year. The origin of these movements does not lie solely in the propaganda of a few leaders; they are also undoubtedly the outcome of too sudden a disturbance of the old equilibrium, of a certain social disorganization common to transition periods such as China is passing through under the influence of modern ideas, and even of the moral anarchy provoked in certain cases by the sudden abandonment of the family system."

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12

Class solidarity is replacing guild solidarity among both managers and workers. Between factories competition is taking the place of the cooperation practiced within the guilds. The organization of employers' associations and trade unions [1] among the commercial groups and the increase in the size of the trading houses and stores has tended to accentuate class interest and destroy the former sense of trade solidarity.

(2) CONDITIONS UNFAVORABLE TO THE CONSERVATION OF THE OLD VALUES IN THE NEW ECONOMIC LIFE

The rapidity of the spread of the capitalistically controlled factory system in its present form, accompanied until very recently by passive acceptance by the masses and an eager welcome by the intellectuals [2] and business men, and a general disregard on the part of both government and public of the social results of the industrial and commercial revolution, would seem to point in the direction of a complete destruction not only of the old organizations but also of the relation-

[1] *Cf.* pp. 225-227.

[2] Mr. V. K. Ting, head of the Chinese Geological Survey, formerly mayor of Shanghai, in dealing with the recent changes in China, said: "Industrialisation based on modern science enables us to develop and utilize our natural resources on a large scale. . . . Even to a casual observer the phenomenal growth of the cotton mills must attract his attention . . . silk filatures have a similar story. . . . They represent only one phase of the general tendency of industrialization. . . . The development of the coal mining industry deserves special mention. Unlike the cotton and silk factories it has nothing to do with Treaty Ports. In 1911 there was not a single mine financed with Chinese capital and operated by Chinese engineers. . . . At present there are more than a dozen prosperous companies owned and operated by Chinese with an aggregate capital of 60 million dollars and a capacity of producing 8 million tons per annum out of the 14 million tons produced by all the modern mines in China. . . . Every new mine organized by the Chinese means a fresh training ground for mining students and every little lighting plant requires at least a skilled electrician. The result is that a nucleus of professional men has been created who will form the backbone of the future Chinese Republic." —Quoted in Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-113.

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124 Thus, the two investigators went their rounds to these families every day, except Sunday, for seven months and recorded their daily accounts with care and diligence. During the months that the inquiry was conducted, the investigators met the field secretary once every week, presenting their books for scrutiny and criticism and discussing with him questions that arose in the course of their work. Discrepancies that were discovered in the books were either at once corrected after thorough discussion or to be ascertained later by the investigators. In this way were the books kept under supervision continuously for seven months. According to what was arranged, the inquiry ought to have been concluded in March, 1927 but it was found necessary to prolong one more month as some accounts taken in October, 1926, were incomplete and had to be rejected. Altogether 362 books were returned, but excluding those which were either incomplete or inadequate for our purpose either on account of the composition of the family or the nature of the income, only the accounts of forty-eight families, aggregating 288 books in all, were selected for analysis and computation.

During the period of the inquiry, a gift of 100-150 coppers was made to each family every month as compensation for the trouble its members had to take every day. Now as the gift for the six months amounted only to $2.00 to each family, its effect on the families would, therefore, hardly be so much as to change their standard of living. Apart from the gift in money, toys were also presented to the children on festival and new year days, their value being, as a rule, only ten or twenty cents.

565 735 While the social aspects of the working families under investigation will be treated in a later chapter, it would be of interest at this juncture to consider their status and see what social or economic class in Peking they may claim to represent. According to an estimate made by the Peking Police Department in December, 1926, the families of the Metropolis were classified under five economic groups and distributed in the following manner.

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Table 1.—Distribution of Families in Peking, by Economic Classes

Class	Peking City	Suburbs	Total
The destitute.....	24,037	18,946	42,982
The poor.....	9,730	13,890	23,620
The lower middle.....	92,394	28,043	120,437
The comfortable.....	37,559	19,433	56,992
The well-to-do	6,618	3,732	10,350
All Classes.....	170,338	84,044	254,382

It should be observed that the classification is arbitrary and the classes are not so distinct as they seem to appear. First of all, as far as we can gather, no clear and official definition seemed to have been given to the classes. And it is doubtful if the families were all entered properly in their respective classes, since the enumerator was not guided by any well-defined conception of economic classes. However, these figures may be taken as on the whole approximate, because the estimate was made by the police authorities with a view to studying the extent of poverty in Peking—the estimate being made once every year in early winter—and to planning out relief work in winter months. Accordingly the destitute were understood as absolutely penniless and having no means of livelihood, the poor as those whose incomes are insufficient even for the bare subsistence of their members unless they are supplemented by gifts or relief, and the lower middle class as those whose incomes are narrowly sufficient to cover their daily living expenses. Such being the general, though somewhat crude, conceptions of the three lower classes, it is interesting to note, however, that the poor and the lower middle classes, according to the estimation of the police, correspond roughly to the "primary poverty" and "secondary poverty" classes of Mr. Seebohm Rowntree.[1]

[1] See *Poverty: A Study of Town Life*, Chapter IV, London, 1901. Those live in primary proverty "whose total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency," and in secondary poverty "whose total earnings would be sufficient for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency were it not that some portion of it is absorbed by other expenditure, either useful or wasteful."

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565 735 The question may now be raised as to where our forty-eight families belong. If the receiving of relief be used as a criterion to determine the classification of families, it is clear that, since thirty-two of the families have received relief from one charitable agency or another, two-thirds of them belong to the poor class while the remaining third are of the lower middle class. Yet it may be urged that the receiving of relief is sometimes invalid as a criterion, for it is often found impossible to tell whether all those who receive relief are really deserving or whether those independent of charity are capable of maintaining their subsistence adequately. It is commonly known that some poor people refuse to accept any relief even at the expense of privation and suffering simply because they consider it below their dignity to do so whereas many accept it as a matter of course, as the additional income would not involve any corresponding effort or labour on their part. The table of incomes in Appendix I shows clearly that the families receiving relief were not necessarily those with low incomes. From these observations it may be concluded that the receiving of alms or relief can hardly be relied upon as an adequate criterion to determine the economic status of the families.

431 565 735 In this connection, it is important to note the prominent place occupied by the presents and gifts in the family incomes. A perusal of the table of incomes[1] will find that the item of presents and gifts occurs in the account of every family. Excluding the families receiving less than four dollars during the six months, which amount we estimate as equivalent to the presents given by our investigators and those in kind given by relatives or friends, we find that twenty out of the forty-eight families had received presents, of which the value in money varied from four to twenty-two dollars. While they were all no doubt given to the families as presents, yet, strictly speaking, at least some of them seemed to partake of the nature of relief in the sense that the money or food was offered at one time or another to help tide over straitened circumstances. For in China, the sense of kinship being still held in high esteem, persons are obliged to offer assistance to

[1] See Appendix I.

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565 their poor relatives, while in reality many of the presents thus
735 offered are by no means different from relief, except that the
431 donor is a relative or friend in the former case and a stranger or an agency in the latter case. It has also been found that the presents these families received far exceeded those given by them to others,[1] a noteworthy fact which clearly suggests that the presents in the former case should be understood as some measure of relief offered by close relatives or friends. Now if we follow this line of reasoning and classify under the poor class those families receiving presents amounting to more than four dollars during the six months, there would remain twenty-eight families which were really self-supporting.

565 Another way of determining the economic status of each
735 family would be to study the earnings received by its members and
434 see if they were sufficient to cover the total expenditure. It will be found from the foregoing table that while only fourteen of the families had sufficient income and also some surplus, thirty-four of them must have relied upon other sources of income, notably presents and relief, to make their ends meet.

As earnings constitute but a part of the total income of each family, its economic status may also be determined by the balance sheet of its total income and expenditure. Taking total income, instead of mere earnings, into consideration, one will find in Table 2 that the number of families with a surplus was appreciably greater. Of the forty-eight families, twenty-seven had each a surplus after their expenditures were met, while twenty-one were found to have each a deficit. Accordingly, it may be said that almost three-fifths of the families under investigation were above the poor class.

565 Obviously none of the above mentioned figures denoting the
735 status of the families can be called conclusive. Yet they all seem to suggest that by and large the families are all on the margin of poverty. It appears that between twenty and twenty-eight families may be considered as of the lower middle class while the

[1] For Social Expenses, see Table 11 (in Chap. V.) or Appendix II.

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remaining portion undoubtedly belong to the poor class. Consequently, our study of the living conditions of the forty-eight families may claim to represent that class of the working population in Peking which, bordering on the edge of poverty, is, according to circumstances, either dependent on some form of relief or just in a position to maintain a meagre existence.

In fact, this class constitutes an enormous portion of the Peking inhabitants, as it includes not only most of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers, such as street hawkers, handicraft workers, and rickshamen, but even some policemen of the lower rank, servants and assistants in small stores. According to a conservative estimate, at least 60,000 families or 270,000 inhabitants of Peking are living under such conditions as our study represents.

II.

The family budget inquiry of the Peking elementary school teachers was instituted in October, 1926. As almost all the elementary schools are under the control or supervision of the Bureau of Education of Peking, arrangement was therefore first of all made with the authorities of the Bureau to enlist teachers who would be willing to keep their daily accounts. A mimeographed leaflet describing the nature and importance of the study was circulated among different schools. As a result, sixty-six teachers, of whom four were women, volunteered to record their own accounts for a period not less than one month. They were then invited to a meeting in which account books were distributed and instructions given. As the account was to be kept only for the month of November, 1926, they were further requested to fill a separate sheet giving the estimate of various items of income and expenditure for the past twelve months, so that items which the month's account could not justly typify might be checked or readjusted according to the estimate of the year. Of the sixty-six teachers who volunteered to keep records, twenty-five returned their accounts promptly a few days after they were completed. After a careful examination of these accounts, twelve were found

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125 to be quite well-kept, supplying sufficient data for our study, while the remaining thirteen had to be rejected either because they were lacking in certain important items or because the heads of the families were, strictly speaking, not of the teaching profession. On the whole, the results of the study must be considered encouraging, as the teachers who took part in the study had without exception gladly contributed their services and generously supplied information sought by us.

875 According to the report published by the Bureau of Education of Peking in August, 1926, the total number of elementary school teachers in this city, including both men and women, was 649. This figure, it must be noted, excluded tutors in private families as well as those teaching in schools not registered at the Bureau. At the time of our inquiry, there must have been about 800 elementary school teachers living in Peking.

875 However, our study of the standard of living of elementary
511 school teachers can hardly claim to represent their class as a
565 whole. The families to which the teachers belonged were not all of a homogeneous group. If the teacher came from a family in which members receiving high incomes were numerous and he himself happened to be only a subordinate member earning pocket money, the standard of living of his family must be considerably higher than that of the families in which teaching was their main, and sometimes their sole, profession. Of the 800 elementary school teachers, there must have been many who belonged to families of the former type and were in fact living as partial dependents.

If the samples of our elementary school teachers' budgets cover only a portion of their class, they may, nevertheless, claim to represent a great number of other "small families" whose incomes are on about the same level as those of the teacher, such as clerks in government offices, police officers and assistants in big stores and banks, who receive on the average about $40.00 a month as the elementary school teacher. From the economic point of view, they are in the same class. It should be observed that some of the artisan class that are highly paid such

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as mechanics, electricians and chauffeurs may also be considered as of this class, but as they are not of the "white collared" profession, it is possible that their living standard differs in many aspects from that of the teacher. On the whole, the standard of living of our elementary school teachers may be said to typify the better portion of the lower middle class and a large part of the comfortable class in Peking.

III.

The accounts of the families were all entered in books specially designed and printed for the inquiry. Each book is 19.4 × 27 cm. in size and contains altogether fifty-eight pages, sufficient for the use of one month. It is divided into five parts:

1. Directions for keeping the accounts.

2. The general schedule. Items of the schedule on the vertical line are members of the family, that is, the head of the family, his wife, sons and daughters, father and mother, brothers and sisters, and others; while items on the horizontal line are: age, present occupation, income per month (in dollars), months with work in the year, working hours per day, holidays per month, at the new year and on the festival days, kind of trade skilled in, money (in dollars) actually given to the family, number of days taking meals at home, number of days taking meals outside, living home, (if not, state where), conditions of health, (strong, weak, cause of weakness, defective, kind of illness and its duration,) educational standing, and religious faith. On the same page, a separate schedule gives the following items: (1) race of the family, birth-place of the head of the family, his wife, father and mother; (2) monthly rent of the house, or the house owned by the family; number of rooms, width and breadth of each room, rooms whether tile-roofed, lime-plastered or mud-covered, the floor whether brick-paved or mud-paved, the roof whether rain-proof or not; (3) extra income of the family, its source and amount per year in dollars; (4) property owned, its form and value; estimated value of all articles owned by the

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property or wealth, ninety have houses only, seventy have both house and land, twenty three have business investments only, while eighteen have all three kinds of property. From this it will be seen that there are only fourteen families owning land as against ninety owning a house only, which seems to point to the fact that people prefer to have their house first before they invest in land.

TABLE XXIX. DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY PROPERTY

PROPERTY OWNERSHIP	NO. OF FAMILIES	PERCENTAGE
No property	139	37.5
House	92	25.1
House and land	70	18.9
Business investment	23	6.2
House, land, business.	18	4.9
Land	14	3.8
House and business	9	2.4
Land and business	4	1.1
Donkey only	1	0.3
Total	371	100.0

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565 If we turn our attention to the value of the property of the 229 families, we find that the distribution is fairly equal and that there are no extremely rich people in the town. The average value of property for the 225 families where the value has been known to the field workers is $654.